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ABSTRACT
This Article describes the transformations underwent by the corporate form from its 
Roman origins to the present. It shows that every time there was a shift in the role of 
the corporation, three theories of the corporation (the aggregate, artificial, and real 
entity theories) were brought forward in cyclical fashion. However, every time the 
real entity theory prevailed, and it is the dominant theory during periods of stability in 
the relationship between the corporation, the shareholders, and the state. The article 
describes this evolution in detail, and then attempts to derive normative consequences 
for the legitimacy of corporate social responsibility (CSR). The basic argument is that 
under the real view, which is historically the dominant view of the corporation, CSR 
is normatively acceptable even when it does not contribute to the long-run welfare of 
the shareholders.
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2I. Introduction
In June, 2001, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan addressed the United 
States Chamber of Commerce with an impassioned plea for business to “take 
concerted action against the unparalleled nightmare of AIDS”.2 After discussing the 
dimensions of the global AIDS crisis, the Secretary General went on to argue that 
business leaders should get involved in the campaign to stop the spread of AIDS 
“because AIDS affects business… the business community needs to get involved to 
protect its bottom line… there is a happy convergence between what your 
shareholders pay you for, and what is best for millions of people the world over.”3
The problem with this appeal is that  it is unlikely to be true for the majority of Mr. 
Annan’s audience. It is hard to show that combating the AIDS crisis in Africa will 
have any discernible impact on the bottom line for shareholders of an office 
equipment manufacturer in Kalamazoo, Michigan. In fact, a recent review of the 
literature on “corporate social responsibility” (CSR), the code name for all the various 
ways for-profit enterprises can help their communities and the world, has shown that 
it is very hard to demonstrate any significant positive correlation between CSR and 
the “bottom line.”4
On the other hand, it is also clear that in many cases, corporations are in a better 
position to help human development than either governments or non-for-profit 
organizations. Corporations are typically smaller and more efficient than unwieldy 
government bureaucracies, and in the developing world, are also less corrupt. And 
corporations possess greater resources, both financial and technical, than most non-
governmental organizations (NGOs).
Thus, an important question arises: Given that corporations are frequently in the best 
position to help human development, should they be permitted to do so when there is 
no clear benefit for their shareholders? This is a question that has been frequently 
addressed by academics in the last half century, and overwhelmingly they have
answered in the negative. From Theodore Levitt’s classic 1958 article on “The 
Dangers of Social Responsibility”5 to Milton Friedman’s influential NY Times 
magazine article in 1970,6 to current writings by Michael Jensen and others,7 the 
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4success would enhance the agency cost problem and make it impossible to evaluate 
managers with any reasonable degree of objectivity.9
And yet, the debate persists, because most managers in fact do want to engage (or at 
least appear to engage) in CSR, arguing (in the face of the evidence) that this is in the 
“long run” benefit of the shareholders.10 Moreover, they are permitted to do so by the 
ALI Principles of Corporate Governance, which state that “[e]ven if corporate profit 
and shareholder gain are not thereby enhanced, the corporation, in the conduct of its 
business…May devote a reasonable amount of resources to public welfare, 
humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic purposes.”11 This formulation represents 
a compromise between the wishes of management for maximum freedom and the 
consensus of corporate law academics.
This Article will attempt to shed a new light on this debate by putting it in historical 
perspective. Historically, the corporation evolved from its origins in Roman law in a 
series of four major transformations. First, the concept of the corporation as a 
separate legal person from its owners or members had to be developed, and this 
development was only completed with the work of the civil law Commentators in the 
fourteenth century. By the end of the Middle Ages, the membership corporation, i.e., 
a corporation with several members who chose others to succeed them, had legal 
personality (the capacity to own property, sue and be sued, and even bear criminal 
responsibility) and unlimited life, was well established in both civil and common law 
jurisdictions. The next important step was the shift from non-profit membership 
corporations to for-profit business corporations, which took place in England and the 
U.S. in the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century. The third 
transformation was the shift from closely-held corporations to corporations whose 
shares are widely held and publicly traded, and with it the rise of limited liability and 
freedom to incorporate, which took place by the end of the nineteenth century and the 
beginning of the twentieth. Finally, the last major transformation was from 
corporations doing business in one country to multinational enterprises whose 
operations span the globe, which began after World War II and is still going on today.  
Each of these four transformations (as well as a smaller, more temporary one which 
occurred in the U.S. in the 1980s with the advent of hostile takeovers) was 
accompanied by changes in the legal conception of the corporation. What is 
remarkable, however, is that throughout all these changes spanning two millennia, the 
same three theories of the corporation can be discerned. Those theories are the 
aggregate theory, which views the corporation as an aggregate of its members or 
shareholders; the artificial entity theory, which views the corporation as a creature of 
the State; and the real entity theory, which views the corporation as neither the sum of 
9
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5its owners nor an extension of the state, but as a separate entity controlled by its 
managers.12
In this Article, we will describe the transformations underwent by the corporate form 
from its Roman origins to the present. In addition, we will show that every time there 
was a shift in the role of the corporation, all three theories were brought forward in 
cyclical fashion. However, every time the real entity theory prevailed, for reasons we 
will discuss below, and it is the dominant theory during periods of stability in the 
relationship between the corporation, the shareholders, and the state. We will describe 
this evolution in detail, and then attempt to derive normative consequences for the 
legitimacy of CSR. Our basic argument is that under the real view, which we will 
argue is historically the dominant view of the corporation, CSR is normatively 
acceptable even when it does not contribute to the long-run welfare of the 
shareholders.
The Article is divided into three parts. After this Introduction, Part II describes the
evolution of the corporate form from Roman law to the present, and shows how in 
each of the four transformations undergone by the corporation all three theories 
tended to arise, but that the real theory ended up as the dominant one. Part III draws 
the normative conclusions, and argues that if indeed the real theory is the dominant 
theory of the corporation from a historical perspective, it provides a new way of 
justifying CSR, even when it is does not benefit the shareholders and involves 
problems for which the corporation is not responsible, like the AIDS crisis. In 
addition, Part III puts the three theories of the corporation into a comparative 
perspective, drawing on the “varieties of capitalism” literature, and argues that each 
theory exemplifies one type of capitalist structure. This, in turn, explains the different 
attitudes to CSR in different contemporary capitalist environments.
12
 These three theories are the standard ones in the literature. See, e.g., Millon, supra.
6II. The Cyclical Transformations of the Corporate Form
The corporation as a legal person separate from its owners is a uniquely Western 
institution. Other legal systems, such as Muslim law, did not (before they were influenced 
by the West) have a concept of legal personality separate from individual human beings. 
The corporate form originated in Roman law in its classical period (the first two centuries 
AD), was further developed in the Middle Ages in both canon (Church) and civil law, 
and was adopted from civil law by the Anglo-American common law tradition. 
In the West, the existence of the corporate form was crucial to the development of several 
other important institutions, such as the university (whose very name derives from the 
Latin term for corporation, universitas) and Parliament. It has in fact been argued that 
other important Western developments such as the rise of representative democracy and 
the scientific revolution can be tied to the corporate form.13
To get from the Roman origins of the corporate form to today’s multinational enterprises, 
the corporation had to undergo several crucial changes. First, the concept of the 
corporation as a separate legal person from its owners or members had to be developed, 
and this development was only completed with the work of the civil law Commentators 
in the fourteenth century. By the end of the Middle Ages, the membership corporation, 
i.e., a corporation with several members who chose others to succeed them, had legal 
personality (the capacity to own property, sue and be sued, and even bear criminal 
responsibility) and unlimited life, was well established in both civil and common law 
jurisdictions. The next important step was the shift from non-profit membership 
corporations to for-profit business corporations, which took place in England and the 
U.S. in the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century. The third 
transformation was the shift from closely-held corporations to corporations whose shares 
are widely held and publicly traded, and with it the rise of limited liability and freedom to 
incorporate, which took place by the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of 
the twentieth. Finally, the last major transformation was from corporations doing 
business in one country to multinational enterprises whose operations span the globe, 
which began after World War II and is still going on today. 
Each of these four transformations (as well as a smaller, more temporary one which 
occurred in the U.S. in the 1980s with the advent of hostile takeovers) was accompanied 
by changes in the legal conception of the corporation. What is remarkable, however, is 
that throughout all these changes spanning two millennia, the same three theories of the 
corporation can be discerned. Those theories are the aggregate theory, which views the 
corporation as an aggregate of its members or shareholders; the artificial entity theory, 
which views the corporation as a creature of the State; and the real entity theory, which 
13
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a separate entity controlled by its managers. 
In this Part , we will describe the transformations underwent by the corporate form from 
its Roman origins to the present. In addition, we will show that every time there was a 
shift in the role of the corporation, all three theories were brought forward in cyclical 
fashion. However, every time the real entity theory prevailed, for reasons we will discuss 
below, and it is the dominant theory during periods of stability in the relationship 
between the corporation, the shareholders, and the state.
81. First Transformation: The Establishment of the Corporation as a Legal Person.
Scholars have been debating for a long time whether classical Roman Law had in fact 
developed a concept of the corporation as a legal person with legal attributes (owning 
property, the capacity to sue and be sued) separate not just from its members as 
individuals but also from its members as a group.14 The classical texts are in fact 
ambiguous and reflect different views.15 But one can already discern in them the three 
views of the corporation outlined above.
The artificial entity view, for example, is reflected in the following excerpt from the 
classical jurist Gaius:
Partnerships, collegia, and bodies of this sort may not be formed by everybody at 
will; for this right is restricted by statutes, senatus consulta, and imperial 
constitutiones. In a few cases only are bodies of this sort permitted. For example, 
partners in tax farming, gold mines, silver mines, and salt works are allowed to form 
corporations. Likewise, there are certain collegia at Rome whose corporate status has 
been established by senatus consulta and imperial constitutiones, for example, those 
of the bakers and certain others and of the shipowners, who are found in the provinces 
too. Those permitted to form a corporate body consisting of a collegium or 
partnership or specifically one or the other of these have the right on the pattern of the 
state to have common property, a common treasury, and an attorney or syndic 
through whom, as in a state, what should be transacted and done in common is 
transacted and done.16
The emphasis here is on the authority granted to the various types of corporation by the 
state: without imperial permission, they could not have legal personality, own property, or 
have an agent who can act in their name. In fact, we know from other sources that the 
Roman emperors were suspicious of private corporations, especially in the provinces, as 
potentially seditious, and refused permission to set up such corporations even for seemingly 
innocuous purposes.17
The aggregate view of the corporation as equivalent to its members acting collectively is 
reflected in the following excerpt from the classical jurist Paul:
14
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9Citizens of a municipality can possess nothing of themselves, because the consent of all 
is not possible. Hence, they do not possess the marketplace, public buildings, and the 
like, but they use them in common. The younger Nerva, however, says that they can 
both possess and usucapt through a slave what he has acquired through his peculium; 
there are, however, those who think differently, since the citizens do not own the slaves 
themselves.18
This refers to the Roman concept of possession (possessio), which requires animus and 
corpus, the intention to possess and the capacity to hold19; Paul is saying that since the 
members of a corporation cannot have a single animus, they cannot actually own anything.20
A similar aggregate view can also be discerned in the excerpt from Gaius cited above, where 
he discusses the members acting collectively through an agent. The same view is also 
reflected in the classical prohibition against instituting corporate bodies as heirs because 
they are “uncertain”, i.e., their membership is changing.21
The real view, finally, is mostly reflected in the excerpts of the classical jurist Ulpian. For 
example:
If members of a municipality or any corporate body appoint an attorney for legal 
business, it should not be said that he is in the position of a man appointed by several 
people; for he comes in on behalf of a public authority or corporate body, not on behalf 
of individuals.22
Ulpian here uses “universitas” (corporate body) as equal to the “municipes” (members), and 
speaks of the representative as acting for the corporate body rather than on behalf of the 
“individuals”, which can be consistent with the aggregate view; but he also states that the 
representative does not act for the “several people” , which favors the real entity view that 
he acts for the corporation itself. Similarly, he states elsewhere that –
It has very frequently been written in rescripts that a slave belonging to a municipality 
[may] be tortured in capital cases affecting the citizens because he is not their slave but 
18 Paul, D. 41.2.1.22 (Tr. Alan Watson). This could be interpreted as saying that the municipal corporation itself 
possesses the property (supporting the real view), but this is not how the text was read in the Middle Ages (see 
below).
19
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22 Ulpian, D. 3.4.2.
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the state’s, and the same should be said of other slaves belonging to corporate bodies; 
for the slave appears to belong, not to a number of individuals, but to the body [itself].23
This text likewise reflects Ulpian’s real entity view of the corporation as separate not just 
from the individual members but also from the “number of individuals” in aggregate. A 
slave could not be tortured to give evidence against its master, but he could if the master was 
a corporation.24
Finally, consider the following:
As regards decurions or other corporate bodies, it does not matter whether all the 
members remain the same or only some or whether all have changed. But if a corporate 
body is reduced to one member, it is usually conceded that he can sue and be sued, since 
the rights of all have fallen to one and the corporate body continues to exist in name 
only.25
In this text Ulpian envisages the corporate body as remaining unchanged as the membership 
changes, and he even considers the possibility of a “corporation sole.” This is the clearest 
evidence of the real entity view in the Roman texts; but note that not even Ulpian could 
imagine a corporation continuing to exist without any members.
The same debate continued through the Middle Ages. Consider the following examples, 
which come from the Ordinary Gloss by Franciscus Accursius (1182-1258), which was 
written around 1250 and summarized the previous century’s work by the jurists in Bologna 
of commenting on the Corpus Juris Civilis.  
First, the artificial entity view:
Of others: Which are many: The congregation of any city, village or castle ... similarly 
any congregation to uphold justice, such as the Tuscan scholars or the entire university 
... similarly religious congregations ... And because certain societies are permitted, as the 
text says, it is clear that normally they are prohibited ... But can a society, such as that of 
scholars living in one inn, appoint an agent [to sue]?  It seems they can, if the case is the 
society's, as it is a permitted society.26
Here Accursius emphasizes the need for a society to get permission from the state to have 
legal personality, just as Gaius did in the text he was commenting upon. The identity of the 
23 Ulpian, D. 48.18.1.7.
24 Similarly the concept of limited liability: A debt to a corporate body is not a debt to individuals and a 
debt of a corporate body is not the debt of individuals. D. 3. 4.7.1. But this text is more ambiguous because 
it can be interpreted as distinguishing the debts owed by the individual members from debts owed by them 
as a group. See also Gaius, Inst. 2.11: What is public is considered to be nobody's property, because it is 
believed to belong to the corporate body itself.  Private goods belong to individual people.  Again, the 
distinction is between property owned by individuals and the collective.
25 Ulpian, D. 3.4.7.2.
26
 GO on D. 3.4.1.1(cited above), v. aliorum. The translation of this and other medieval texts is mine.
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state has changed (the Bolognese jurists professed allegiance to the German emperors), as 
did the identity of the corporations, but the concept is similar.
The aggregate view can be seen in Accursius’ definition of the agent as “Syndicus: Who 
acts for any corporate body, but only for the many ... for he is called syndicus because he 
argues (dicens) cases for the single ones (singulorum).”27 Here the agent is seen as speaking 
for the members as a collective, as opposed to the members as individuals.28 Similarly, 
Accursius rejected the concept of limited liability, requiring the members to be liable for 
debts of the corporation, which again reflects the aggregate view.29 And he allows departing 
members to take their share, although not of inheritances or other property that belonged to 
the corporation itself.30
In yet other locations, the real entity view predominates, even when it requires challenging 
the Roman authorities. For example-
The people are called by trumpet or by bell or by voice, and even though they do not all 
come, the majority of two thirds can consent ... Thus this law conceives they cannot all 
will together easily ... But they can with difficulty.31
It is as if [Paul] said not easily, because they cannot will together easily ... but they can 
with difficulty, so as when a bell is tolled, because all are considered to have done what 
the council or a majority did ... and they can commit intimidation ... and obtain 
possession ... and elect a tribune or leader ... for this question notes the rarity, not the 
impossibility [of doing so].32
27 GO on D.3.4.1.1 (cited above), v. syndicum.
28
 See also GO on C. 10.31.30, v. reipublicae: “And say that they all act through the agent or syndicus
whom they elect;” GO on D. 3.4.2, v. haberi (cited above): “An agent stipulates for the corporate body, not 
for its individual members.”
29
 “But what if they have nothing common to satisfy creditors?  They must be compelled to make 
collections so that they will have something in common.” GO on D.3.4.1.2 v. proconsul.
30
“Or say that whatever colleges and corporate bodies have also belongs to the single [members], and 
whoever withdraws receives his portion, because they have something in common through combining 
goods of the individual members ... but when a legacy is left to a college or a town, it is left only to those 
who are members of the college, and they divide it, so that if anyone withdraws, he receives nothing, 
because it does not belong to the single individuals [as such], but to the town's citizens or to the members of 
the college.”  GO on D.47.22.1.1 v. competit. “But what if the corporate body is dissolved, can any 
member demand his portion as a proper and private debt? [Yes], because that is the rule [when the body 
still exists], here therefore even more so. ... But if some corporate body has a common grove that is 
otherwise undivided, should the creditors be given possession of that part that seems to belong to them?  I 
do not think so, because neither the grove nor any part thereof belong to anybody.” GO on D.3.4.7.1 v. non 
debetur.
31 GO on D. 50.160.1 v. refertur, citing D. 41.2.1.22 (cited above).
32 GO on D. 4.3.15.1 v. facere possunt (cited above).
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Here Accursius rejects Paul’s view that corporate bodies cannot own anything because they 
cannot will together, referring to the notion that the majority if the members can act for the 
corporate body.33 Likewise, 
What if a member of a corporate body injures you, can the corporate body be said to 
have done it and be sued by you?  It seems that not, because he did it out of his own will, 
not as a corporate body, i.e., after deliberation and sounding a bell or having been 
otherwise gathered together.  On the contrary, yes, because a corporate body is nothing 
more than the people who are there.34
This text clearly reflects the aggregate view. However, when Accursius considers the 
question what happens when the membership changes, he seems to reject the aggregate view 
in favor of the real entity view:
Some say that goods that belong to a college belong to the people, or to many single 
individuals ... but they do not concede that if those [individuals] die the people is dead, 
because others are considered (finguntur) to take their place.  Thus the emitted cry 
perishes, but not your voice.  But what is argued to the contrary, that the goods do not 
belong to single individuals, is true, as can be proven by the law against torturing 
slaves.35
This text conceives of the membership corporation as unchanging even though the 
individual members change. This could still be consistent with the aggregate view (the 
membership remains as a collective), but the rejection of the view that the goods belong to 
“many single individuals” and the citation to Ulpian suggest the real entity view. 
Finally, consider the following:
Even though a single person cannot be a corporate body, he still retains the rights of the 
corporate body, even though a single person cannot constitute a corporate body initially, 
but only three persons ... But can he appoint a syndicus, who argues cases for the many, 
or [at least] for two?  It seems so ... But what if nobody at all remains, [asks] Johannes 
[Bassianus]? The college is then dissolved, and the goods belong to nobody, like 
inherited goods.  But if thereafter by authority of the Pope or whoever is in charge of 
33
 Similarly: “They are like one body, whether all are present or whether two thirds are, and whatever the 
majority of this present body does, is valid.” GO on D.3.4.3, v. due partes; “[Rogerius said that] members 
of municipalities cannot possess, but those to whom the administration of the members is entrusted ... 
[Accursius]: They can properly possess through those to whom the municipality's affairs are entrusted.” GO 
on D.41.2.1.22 v. adquiratur (cited above). Accursius also makes a distinction between what can happen 
naturally and “by law”: “Here it is doubted whether they can all swear by nature, but similarly children and 
others who are like a corporate body, who cannot swear by nature, but can by law.” GO on D. 35.1.97, v. 
geruntur (cited above). And he rejects the notion that corporate bodies are “uncertain”: “It is no objection 
that a corporate body is said not to be able to consent, because it should be understood as "easily" ... or add by 
the order of those who manage the corporate body.” GO on D. 29.2.25.2 v. adibit; see also GO on D. 4.2.9.1 v. 
collegium (corporate bodies can be guilty of fraud and intimidation).
34
 GO on D.3.4.7.1 v. non debetur (above).
35
 GO on D.47.22.1.1 v. competit.
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that college, someone is appointed to that college, by the artifice of the law the goods are 
considered (fingitur) to belong to him ... Even though some Bishop Moses said that the 
walls themselves possess even during the existence of the college, which seems very 
difficult to say and contrary to the law.  To the contrary, in no way do the goods belong 
to anyone, but once the college has been dissolved, by the law they belong to the fisc or 
the Pope. ... But it can be said for Moses, that the church is frequently called the place 
itself which is surrounded by walls and consecrated; and it is also said that the church 
can have rights and possess and sue ... thus the location itself, or the walls, possess even 
while the college exists, through the priest, like a private person through an agent.36
In this gloss on Ulpian, Accursius goes beyond his Roman source to ask (following his 
predecessor Johannes Bassianus) what happens if all members of a corporation die. He then 
resorts to the artificial entity theory to argue that the state should appoint a replacement; 
alternatively, he states that the college ceases to exist, consistent with the aggregate view.37
But he also mentions the possibility that the “location” of the corporation continues to exist, 
which is closer to the real entity view. There is no resolution: all three views co-exist in this 
text.
A hundred years later, however, the real entity view comes to predominate. This can be seen 
in the following examples from the work of Bartolus of Sassoferato (1314-1357), the most 
important of the Commentators, the generation that followed the Glossators in further 
developing the interpretation of the Roman text. The work of Bartolus was influential well 
into the nineteenth century, i.e., until the codification movement, which replaced the Corpus 
Juris Civilis as the main source of civil law.38
Bartolus clearly adhered to the real entity view of the corporation. First, he rejected the 
artificial entity view that permission by the state is needed to set up a corporation: “If some 
people want to settle in some place, and create a city, castle, or village, they can do so, as it 
is permitted by the law of nations.”39 This is understandable because by Bartolus’ time the 
Holy Roman Empire had ceased to exist as a force in Italian political life and the Italian city-
states were independent municipal corporations.40
36
 GO on D. 3.4.7.2 v. nomen universitatis (cited above).
37 The reference to the Pope may be a reflection of the work of Accursius’ contemporary Innocent IV, who 
developed the concept of the corporation as artificial entity and applied it to the Church. See, e.g., Innocent 
IV, Commentary on X.2.12.4: “From this we order, and because of it we say, that whenever the priest and all 
the clergy of a church die, nevertheless the property remains in Christ who lives forever, or in the universal 
Church, which never dies.” Similarly: “A corporate body, like a chapter, the people, and similar [entities], are 
legal names, not persons, and therefore they cannot be excommunicated.” Innocent IV, Commentary on 
X.5.39.52; “It is proper that they swear through one, because a college in a case of the corporate body is 
fictively considered a person.” Innocent IV, Commentary on X.2.20.57, n.5.
38
 For development of the corporate personality between Bartolus and the nineteenth century see, e.g., T. 
Kilcullen, The Collegiate Moral Person as Party Litigant (1947) (canon law); F.M. Hussen-De Groot, 
Rechtspersonen in de 19e eeuw: een studie van privaatrechtlijke rechtpersonen in de 19e eeuwse wetgeving 
van Frankrijk, Nederland en Duitsland (1976) (France, the Netherlands, Germany); F. Hallis, Corporate 
Personality (1930) (England).
39
 Bartolus, Commentary on D.3.4.1.1 (cited above).
40
 Following the death of Emperor Frederick II (1250) there was a long interregnum, which weakened the 
empire and strengthened the Italian city states.  The premature death of Henry VII (1314) effectively 
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Second, Bartolus clearly envisaged the corporation remaining even if all of its members 
perish: “What if this university [Perugia] were to perish by pestilence, and nobody 
remained?  ... The privileges would remain in the place where it was.”41 This commentary 
was probably written after the Black Death of 1347-1348 swept through Europe, so it 
reflects the reality of Bartolus’ time. But it also goes beyond Accursius and Ulpian to reject 
the aggregate view.
Instead, Bartolus developed the concept of the corporation as persona representata, i.e., a 
legal personality that is separate from both the state and its members, but that had to act 
through agents. For example: 
A corporate body is a legal name, and it does not have a soul or an intellect.  
Therefore it cannot commit crimes ... Others say, that corporate bodies can commit 
crimes ... We must consider first, whether a corporate body differs from its 
members?  Some say no, like the philosophers and canonists, who hold that the 
whole does not really differ from its parts.  The truth is, that if we speak about reality 
proper, those say the truth.  For a university of scholars is nothing other than the 
scholars.  But according to legal fiction they err.  For a university represents a 
person, which is different than the scholars, or its members ... Thus, if some scholars 
leave and others return, nevertheless the university stays the same.  Similarly if all 
members of a people die and others take their place, the people is the same ... and 
thus a corporate body is different from its members, by legal fiction, because it is a 
represented person ... [Thus] a corporate body can commit crimes of omission, 
because the corporate body itself omits, even though it is done by the negligence of 
its rulers ... [Some crimes of commission] can be committed by corporate bodies, 
nor can it be said that somebody private did it, but the corporate body itself ... 
[murder and other acts of violence] cannot be committed by the corporate body 
itself, for that requires a real person ... but they can be committed by its rulers ... but 
it cannot be beheaded, as it has no real head, but only a fictive one.42
This text shows that Bartolus had a clear vision of the corporation as separate both from the 
state and from its members. It was a “legal fiction” that could have the basic attributes of 
legal personality, i.e., the capacity to own property, sue and be sued, and even commit 
crimes, although in all these respects it had to act through its agents, and it was not subject to 
certain kinds of punishment.43
What enabled Bartolus to go beyond his Roman and medieval sources to reach this 
conclusion? In part, it was a natural evolution of moving away from and beyond the ancient 
eliminated the last chance that the Empire would be restored to the position it held in the middle of the 
twelfth century. See Dante Alighieri, Vita Nuova (1988).
41
 Bartolus, Comm. on D. 47.22.4. See also Comm. On D.3.4.7.2: “Even though the individuals change, the 
corporate body remains the same.” 
42 Comm. on D. 48.19.16.10.
43
 See also Bartolus, Comm. On D.41.2.2 (corporate body as represented body can possess property); 
Comm. On D. 34.5.21 (an inheritance left to the corporate body is not the same as an inheritance left to its 
members).
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text through the process of commentary and debate, which can also be seen for example in 
medieval commentary on Aristotle.44 Interestingly, it was the rise of universities that 
enabled this unique process of comment and debate to take place in the West, and the rise of 
universities in turn was premised on the availability of the corporate form.45
But Bartolus was also influenced by external factors, the most important of which were the 
decline of the Holy Roman Empire, which led to the abandonment of artificial entity theory 
that corporations needed imperial permission to exist, and the rise of independent 
corporations in Italy such as the city state and the Italian universities. For these corporations 
to maintain their independence, they needed to be seen as separate both from the state and 
from their members, since even the collective membership could perish. Bartolus and his 
colleagues did not want the privileges and property of the university to revert to the Popes or 
the Emperors should the membership all change at once. Hence, the natural theory for 
Bartolus to embrace as representative of the university was real entity theory, which enabled 
the university to maintain its independence both from the state and from its members.46
We thus see that in the period between the classical Roman jurists in the second century AD 
and the Commentators in the fourteenth century the concept of the corporation as a legal 
person gradually evolved, and that as this evolution proceeded all three theories of the 
corporation (aggregate, artificial entity, and real entity) were brought forward by various 
legal commentators. We also see that in the end, aided by external factors such as the 
decline of the state, real entity theory, which most closely reflects the views and interests of 
corporate management, emerges as the dominant theory. As we shall see, this pattern of 
debate among the three theories followed by the triumph of real entity theory is typical of 
subsequent transformations in the role of the corporation as well. 
44




 See Avi-Yonah, Universitas: The Development of Corporate Personality from Labeo to Bartolus (1989).
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2. Second Transformation: From Non-Profit to For-Profit Corporations.
The period between Bartolus (mid 14th century) and the late 18th century was one of 
relative stability in the development of the corporate form. The corporation was 
established as a membership corporation, i.e., a corporation made up of members who 
selected their own successors, like the President and Fellows of Harvard College still do 
today. As such, a corporation had legal personality, i.e., the rights to own property, sue 
and be sued, act under a common seal, and other such “chestnuts.”47 Private corporations 
were used primarily for non-profit purposes (e.g., hospitals and universities), but by the 
18th century there were also some commercial ones (e.g., the East India Company).48
From our perspective, there were two significant developments in this period. The first 
was the reassertion of royal control over corporations; in England and other European 
countries corporations could only be established by royal charter. Blackstone notes that 
although in Roman law corporations could be established without “the prince’s consent”, 
“with us in England, the king’s consent is absolutely necessary.”49 Second, some degree 
of outside control over management was established through the institution of the 
committee of visitors, which represented the interests of the founder and of the wider 
community.50
But other than in extraordinary cases, the real entity view of the corporation prevailed 
throughout this period and management (the members) were firmly in control. “A 
corporation aggregate of many is invisible, immortal, and rests only in intendment and 
consideration of the law.”51 As such, it was a self-perpetuating body subject to relatively 
little outside regulation. Corporations, Blackstone notes, are “artificial persons, who may 
maintain a perpetual succession, and enjoy a kind of legal immortality.”52 When the 
members “are consolidated and united into a corporation, they and their successors are 
then considered as one person in law: as one person, they have one will, which is 
collected from the sense of the majority of the individuals… for all the individual 
members that have existed from the foundation to the present time, or that shall ever 
hereafter exist, are but one person in law, a person that never dies.”53 This one person 
then acquires all the rights of corporations, including perpetual succession, the right to 
sue and be sued, the right to own property, to have a common seal, to make by-laws, and 
to be subject to certain criminal liabilities.54 The king constituted corporations, and the 
king or other visitors exercised some degree of supervision over them, but once 
established, the corporation (i.e., its members) remained subject to relatively little outside 
regulation.
47
 Robert C. Clark, Corporate Law (1989). As we have seen these “chestnuts” were not at all self-evident.
48
 See the classification and description of various corporations in William Blackstone, 1 Commentaries, 
chap. XVIII (1765). 
49
 Blackstone, 460; Tipling v. Pexall, 3 Bulstrode 233 (1614) (“the King creates them”). For an example of 












This situation meant that corporate status was very desirable, especially since the 
members also enjoyed limited liability for corporate debts.55 But the English Kings were 
very cautious with granting corporate charters, especially in the case of for-profit 
enterprises; only corporations that were clearly vested with a public purpose and 
benefited the public fisc, like the East India and Hudson Bay Companies, received royal 
approval, and accumulated vast power. As more capital was required for commercial 
enterprises this resulted in promoters organizing corporations with transferable shares and 
claimed that under authority of a lost or obsolete charter the shareholders enjoyed limited 
liability. After the South Sea Bubble burst in 1720, this problem led to the Bubble Act, 
under which it became a crime to organize such corporations without explicit royal 
consent.56  Although prosecutions under the Bubble Act were rare, it meant that the entire 
Industrial Revolution in England (1760-1820) took place outside the corporate form and 
without limited liability.57 The Bubble Act was ultimately repealed in 1825, after the 
Industrial Revolution was over, but with the provision of unlimited liability for 
shareholders, which continued to be the rule in England until 1855.58
This situation, which can be seen as a way of maintaining state control over corporations 
through restrictions on charters, meant that the next great shift in the use of corporate 
form took place in the fledgling United States. There, once the revolution was over, every 
state could issue corporate charters. The result was an explosion of charters for 
commercial enterprises. One of the first treatises written on corporate law was Joseph 
Angell and Samuel Ames’ Treatise on the Law of Private Corporations Aggregate, 
published in Boston in 1832.59 Angell and Ames begin their book by stating that-
The reader does not require to be told, that we have in our country an infinite 
number of corporations aggregate, which have no concern whatever with affairs 
of a municipal nature. These associations we not only find scattered throughout 
every cultivated part of the United States, but so engaged are they in all the 
varieties of useful pursuit, that we see them directing the concentration of mind 
and capital to…the encouragement and extension of the great interests of 
commerce, agriculture, and manufacturing. There is a great difference in this 
respect between our own country, and the country from which we have derived a 
great portion of our laws. What is done in England by combination, unless it be 
the management of municipal concerns, is most generally done by a combination 
of individuals, established by mere articles of agreement. On the other hand, what 
55
 Although this was not clear in the Roman sources, it was well established by Blackstone’s time for 
royally chartered corporations. “The debts of a corporation, either to or from it, are totally extinguished by 
its dissolution, so that the members cannot recover, or be charged with them, in their natural capacities.” 
Blackstone, 472 (citing Ulpian).
56
 The Bubble Act, 6 Geo. I c. 18 (1720).
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 For attempts to avoid the Bubble Act which led to prosecutions see King v. Dodd, 9 East 516 (1808) and 
King v. Webb, 14 East 406 (1811).
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 Bubble Act Repeal, 6 Geo. IV c. 91 (1825); Limited Liability Act, 18 & 19 Vict. C. 133 (1855).
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 Angell and Ames were preceded by the English work of John Kyd, published in London in 1793, but that 
treatise was devoted primarily to municipal corporations. See Angell & Ames, vi. The Angell & Ames 
treatise was very successful, with 11 editions published until 1875.
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is done here by the co-operation of several persons is, in the greater number of 
instances, the result of a consolidation effected by an express act or charter of 
incorporation.60
The main reason for this proliferation of corporations in the United States was the second 
great transformation in the role of the corporation in society: from primarily a non-for-
profit to primarily a for-profit enterprise. As Judge Kent stated, “the multiplication of 
corporations in the United States, and the avidity with which they are sought, have arisen 
in consequence of the power which a large and consolidated capital gives them over 
business of every kind; and the facility which the incorporation gives to the management 
of capital, and the security which it affords to the persons of its members, and to their 
property not vested in the corporate stock.”61
 This was a profound shift, and not surprisingly it led to a revival of the centuries- old 
debate about the nature of the corporate form and its relationship to the shareholders and 
to the state. This debate can be seen if we examine the opinions on the subject issued by 
the first great American jurist, John Marshall. Three of Marshall’s opinions, written 
decades apart, are particularly relevant here: Bank of the United States v. Deveaux (1809), 
Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819), and Bank of the United States v. Dandridge
(1827).62 These opinions represent the evolution of his thinking on corporations, which 
moved from the aggregate view (Deveaux) to the artificial entity view (Dartmouth 
College) to the real entity view (Dandridge). 
Deveaux involved an attempt by the state of Georgia to tax the Savannah branch of the 
Bank of the United States, a corporation established by Congress in 1791, as part of the 
early struggles around federalism. The Bank was a membership corporation (“The 
President, Directors and Company of the Bank of the United States”) and all the members 
were citizens of Pennsylvania. The Bank refused to pay the tax and the State sent its 
collectors to enforce payment, whereupon the Bank sued the collectors in federal court, 
claiming diversity jurisdiction. The issue facing the court was whether a corporation 
made up of members from one state could sue citizens of another state in federal court on 
diversity grounds. This in turn required deciding between the view that “the individual 
character of the members is so wholly lost in that of the corporation, that the court cannot 
take notice of it”, and the contrary view that “a corporation is composed of natural 
persons”, i.e., between the entity (artificial or real) and aggregate views.63
Marshall decided in favor of the aggregate view. He stated that the corporation itself, 
“that mere legal entity”, cannot be a citizen or sue in federal court, unless it can be 
60 Angell & Ames, v; see also ibid, 35: “In no country have corporations been multiplied to so great an 
extent, as in our own…There is scarcely an individual of respectable character in our community, who is 
not a member of, at least, one private company or society which is incorporated…Acts of incorporation are 
moreover continually solicited at every session of the legislature.”
61
 Angell & Ames, 36, citing 2 Kent’s Com. 219. The last sentence refers to limited liability, which will be 
discussed below.
62
 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809); 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819); 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 64 (1827). 
63
 Deveaux, 9 U.S. 63-64.
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regarded as “a company of individuals”.64 However, since the reasons that led Congress 
to enact diversity jurisdiction applied to corporations as well, Marshall was inclined to 
see the controversy as being between the members “suing in their corporate character” 
and their opponents.65 “The controversy is substantially between aliens, suing by a 
corporate name, and a citizen…in this case the corporate name represents persons who 
are members of the corporation.”66 The Court therefore held that federal jurisdiction 
existed.
Ten years later Marshall was faced with another difficult issue involving corporations. In 
the famous Dartmouth College case, the state of New Hampshire attempted to alter the 
charter of Dartmouth College (incorporated as a membership corporation by George III in 
1769, under the name of Trustees of Dartmouth College), by transferring the appointment 
of trustees to the state, thereby effectively taking it over. The trustees objected, arguing 
that the charter constituted a contract and altering it violated the contracts clause of the 
Constitution.67
Marshall held that as the College was a private corporation, its charter was a contract and 
was protected by the contracts clause. He began by noting that the funds for the College 
came from private sources and its educational character did not make it public either. He 
then got to the heart of the question- whether the act of incorporation by the state makes 
it possible for the state to take it over. In frequently quoted language, Marshall held that-
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in 
contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those 
properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as 
incidental to its very existence.68
This language reflects the artificial entity view of the corporation. But Marshall then went 
on to note that, having created the corporation, the state may not treat it as a mere 
extension of itself: “this being does not share in the civil government of the country, 
unless that be the purpose for which it was created.”69 Even though its object is to 
promote governmentally approved aims, this does not make corporations into mere 
instruments of government. Instead, the corporation exists to represent the interest of the 
founder and his descendants in the aims for which it was founded. This interest is in the 
United States protected by the contracts clause, although in England, Marshall 
recognized, Parliament had the power to annul the charter.70 In this country “the body 
corporate, as possessing the whole legal and equitable interest, and completely 
representing the donors, for the purpose of executing the trust, has rights which are 
protected by the constitution.”71
64
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It should be noted that while Marshall held that the state may not take over a private 
corporation, even one founded for public ends, the emphasis on the artificial nature of the 
corporation left ample room for state regulation via the original charter. Since states were 
busy granting charters by the hundreds, the Dartmouth opinion left ample room for the 
states to regulate corporations, should they wish to do so. 
Finally, six years later, Marshall was once more called to opine on the nature of 
corporations in another case involving the Bank of the United States.72 The case involved 
a suit by the Bank on a bond executed by Dandridge, one of its cashiers, in which the 
defendant argued that the bond had never been approved by the Board of Directors, as 
required by the charter of incorporation. The key issue was whether the level of evidence 
required of corporations was higher than that required of individuals, since corporations 
are incapable of acting not in writing. Justice Story for the Court held that no distinction 
should be made: “The same presumptions are…applicable to corporations.”73 Marshall, 
however, dissented. He argued that—
The corporation being one entire impersonal entity, distinct from the individuals 
who compose it, must be endowed with a mode of action peculiar to itself, which 
will always distinguish its transactions from those of its members. This faculty
must be exercised according to its own nature…This can be done only in 
writing.74
The Court’s view was the more pragmatic one, but Marshall’s view was more consistent 
with the real entity view of the corporation as distinct from its members, individually or 
collectively. It certainly forms an interesting contrast with the views he expressed in the 
Deveaux case sixteen years earlier.
How can one explain the shift in Marshall’s view of the corporation from aggregate 
(Deveaux) to artificial (Dartmouth College) to real (Dandridge)? In part, this stems from 
the circumstances of these particular cases. In Deveaux, Marshall wanted to confer 
diversity jurisdiction to protect a federal institution (he was after all a Federalist), and the 
only way to do so was to look through the corporation to its members. In Dartmouth 
College, the issue involved the relationship of private corporations (albeit “imbued with a 
public purpose”; the full fledged private/public distinction had not yet evolved) to the 
state, and thus Marshall emphasized the role of the state in creating the corporation, while 
placing clear limits on its ability to regulate corporations thereafter. These limits were 
required as the result of the proliferation of corporations, especially for- profit business 
corporations, since otherwise the state would be able to take over purely private 
businesses. The result in Dartmouth College favored in practice the real entity view, 
since once a private corporation was created, it could no longer be taken over or perhaps 
even be overly regulated by the state. Thus, it may not be surprising that by the time he 
72
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came to write his Dandridge dissent Marshall took the real entity view, even though it 
contradicted his opinion in Deveaux (which is not mentioned).
Two important legal developments during the same period strengthened the real entity 
view and weakened the aggregate and artificial entity views of the corporation: the rise of 
limited liability and the spread of general incorporation laws. Limited liability weakened 
the aggregate view, and general incorporation weakened the artificial entity view. 
First, limited liability: As we have seen, in England limited liability did not exist for 
corporations until 1855. In the United States, however, most states adopted limited 
liability in the 1830s.75 In their second edition, Angell & Ames explain that this was the 
primary distinction between a partnership and a corporation:
In every private unincorporated company, the members are liable for the debts 
without limitation, whereas in incorporated societies, they are only liable to the 
extent of their shares…It is frequently the principal object, in this and in other 
countries, in procuring an act of incorporation, to limit the risk of the partners to 
their shares in the stock of the association; and prudent men are always backward 
in taking stock when they become mere copartners as regards their personal 
liability for the company debts.76
When Angell & Ames wrote this limited liability was by no means a universally 
established rule for corporations77; they were thus trying to establish the law as much as 
describing the law that existed. Their main argument, familiar from current debates on 
limited liability78, was that “[t]he public, therefore, gain by acts incorporating trading 
associations, as by such means persons are induced to hazard a certain amount of 
property for the purposes of trade and public improvement, who would abstain from 
doing so, were not their liability limited.”79
Eventually this argument won the day, and by 1840 most of the states established limited 
liability.80 Limited liability, in turn, led to a decline in the emphasis on the aggregate 
75
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theory, because the aggregate view of corporations tend to reduce the distinction between 
the corporation and its members or shareholders that is at the heart of limited liability. 
The decline of the aggregate view can clearly be seen in two cases from the period 1839-
1844, in which the Supreme Court repudiated Marshall’s opinion in Deveaux. In Bank of 
Augusta v. Earle the Court held that a corporation incorporated by Georgia may execute a 
valid contract in Alabama on comity grounds, but it rejected the argument that Alabama 
was required to accept the contract on the basis of the privileges and immunities clause 
applied directly to the corporation’s members (as required by the aggregate view), stating 
that Deveaux has never been extended that far. Chief Justice Taney emphasized that he 
rejected the aggregate view because of its implications for limited liability, as well as its
implications for state regulation of the corporations operating in it:
The result of this [aggregate view] would be to make the corporation a mere 
partnership in business, in which each stockholder would be liable to the whole 
extent of his property for the debts of the corporation…Besides, it would deprive 
every state of all control over the extent of corporate franchises proper to be 
granted in the state.81
In Louisville, Cincinnati, and Charleston Railroad Co. v. Letson, decided in 1844, the 
Court explicitly limited Deveaux to its facts, holding that diversity jurisdiction may arise 
even when some of the members of a defendant corporation are citizens of the same state 
as the plaintiff.82  The Court stated that the Deveaux results “have never been satisfactory 
to the bar” and that a corporation “seems to us to be a person, although an artificial one, 
inhabiting and belonging to that state [of incorporation], and therefore entitled, for 
purposes of suing and being sued, to be deemed a citizen of that state.”83
This result was required by the proliferation of business corporations having many 
shareholders in many states, as opposed to the membership corporations of Marshall’s 
early days. As Angell & Ames stated, by 1832 “Joint stock companies are composed of 
persons who seldom know any thing of the business of the company, but who leave the 
management of it entirely to the board of directors, and are contented with receiving such 
periodical dividends as the directors think proper to make.”84 The separation of 
management from ownership, and the rise of limited liability, rendered the aggregate 
view implausible.85
shareholders while debts were outstanding. See Wood v. Dummer, 30 Fed. Cas. 435 (Cir. Ct. D. Maine, 
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Second, general incorporation: The granting of corporate charters by state legislatures 
became in the 1820s and 1830s a process fraught with corruption.86  Some Jacksonians 
reacted by advocating elimination of the rights of states to grant corporate charters. But 
the corporate form was so widely used that this was impracticable; instead, laws were 
passed in all the states permitting anyone to form a corporation on payment of a fee, 
without permission by the state legislature.87 This democratizing move meant that the 
artificial entity theory, under which the corporation derives its powers from the state, lost 
most of its appeal, since the state was only vestigially involved in creating corporations. 
Instead, corporations were viewed as separate from both their shareholders and the state, 
and the real entity view reigned supreme.88
corporations, and by a usage, so general and uniform as to be regarded as part of the law of the land, they 
have the general superintendence and active management of all the concerns of the bank, and constitute, for 
purposes of dealing with others, the corporation” (emphasis added). It is hard to imagine a clearer rejection 
of the aggregate view. Similarly,  in Hoyt v. Thompson’s Executor, decided by the New York Court of 
Appeals in 1859, the court held that “[i]n corporate bodies the powers of the board of directors are, in a 
very important sense, original and undelegated. The stockholders do not confer, nor can they revoke those 
powers. They are derivative only in the sense of being received from the State in the act of incorporation. 
The directors convened as a board are the primary possessors of all the powers which the charter confers, 
and like private principals they may delegate to agents of their own appointment the performance of any 
acts which they themselves can perform. The recognition of this principle is absolutely necessary in the 
affairs of every corporation whose powers are vested in a board of directors. Without it the most ordinary 
business could not be carried on, and the corporate powers could not be executed.” 19 N.Y. 207, 216 
(1859). This constitutes a recognition that the aggregate view deriving from the membership corporation 
could not be maintained as a practical matter in corporations with hundreds or thousands of shareholders, as 
already existed in the 1850s.
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3. Third Transformation: From Closely-Held to Widely-Held Corporations.
The situation between the 1820s and the end of the Civil War was thus the proliferation 
of for profit corporations, incorporated under general incorporation laws with minimal 
interference by the state, and whose shareholders enjoyed limited liability. Those
shareholders were, however, relatively limited in number; despite the Angell & Ames 
quotation above, few corporations before 1865 required massive amounts of capital, and 
most were small, closely held enterprises. T his enabled the Civil War income tax to be 
imposed directly on the shareholders of corporations.89
This state of affairs began to change with the advent of the railroads, followed by the 
steel and oil companies. With the rise of large corporate enterprises, massive amounts of 
capital were required, and between 1865 and the 1890s the widely held, publicly traded, 
non-owner managed enterprise gradually became the norm for U.S. business activities. 
This was followed from 1890 to 1906 by a wave of consolidation that left several 
important business areas dominated by monopolies run by the “robber barons.”
The shift from small, closely held enterprises to massive, publicly held ones once again 
necessitated a re-examination of the corporate form, and again all three theories of the 
corporation appear. A classic example of the aggregate view is the Santa Clara case, 
ultimately decided by the Supreme Court in 1886. This case is famous for Chief Justice 
Waite’s statement that “The court does not wish to hear argument on the question 
whether the [equal protection clause] applies to these corporations. We are all of the 
opinion that it does.”90 Some scholars identified this as an application of the real entity 
view to corporations, but Prof. Horwitz has shown by examining Justice Field’s opinion 
in the court below that it actually represented an application of the aggregate view. 
Specifically, Field held that the equal protection clause must apply to corporations for the 
following reasons:
Private corporations consist of an association of individuals united for some 
lawful purpose, and permitted to use a common name in their business and have 
succession of membership without dissolution…But these members do not, 
because of such association, lose their right to protection, and equality of 
protection…Whatever affects the property of the corporation- that is, of all the 
members united by the common name- necessarily affects their interests…So, 
therefore, whenever a provision of the constitution or of a law guarantees to 
persons protection in their property… the benefits of the provision are extended to 
corporations; not to the name under which different persons are united, but to the 
individuals composing the union. The courts will always look through the name to 
see and protect those whom the name represents [citing Deveaux.]91
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25
A clearer statement of the aggregate view can hardly be imagined; most remarkable is 
Field’s reliance on Deveaux despite the fact that the Supreme Court overturned its results 
forty years earlier. Similarly, in Pembina Consolidated Co. v. Pennsylvania, decided two 
years later, Justice Field for the Court stated that “Under the designation of person there 
is no doubt that a private corporation is included. Such corporations are merely 
associations of individuals united for a special purpose.”92
However, the artificial entity view was also raised in these cases. In Santa Clara, the 
railroad corporations made the argument that because they were operating under special 
congressional legislation they should be regarded as an extension of the federal
government and therefore California could not tax them.93 Field rejected this view (citing 
Dartmouth College), but noted that “when the instrumentality is the creation of the state-
a corporation formed under its laws-and is employed or adopted by the general 
government for its convenience…it remains subject to the taxing power of the state.”94
And notably, in Pembina Field followed Taney in rejecting the argument that the 
privileges and immunities clause applied to corporations because they were not 
“citizens”, even though the aggregate view he adopted in Santa Clara might have led to 
the contrary position. Instead, Field emphasized the relationship between the corporation 
and the incorporating state under the artificial entity view:
The term citizens, as used in this clause, applies only to natural persons, members 
of the body politic owing allegiance to the State, not to artificial persons created 
by the legislature, and possessing only such attributes as the legislature has 
prescribed…a grant of corporate existence was a grant of special privileges to the 
corporators, enabling them to act for certain specified purposes as a single 
individual, and exempting them, unless otherwise provided, from individual 
liability.95
Moreover, all three views of the corporation appear in Hale v. Henkel, decided by the 
Supreme Court in 1906. The issues were whether an agent of a corporation could invoke 
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination or the Fourth Amendment 
protection against unreasonable search and seizure in the name of the corporation. On the 
Fifth Amendment issue, the Court held that the right against self-incrimination does not 
apply to corporations:
The right of a person under the Fifth Amendment to refuse to incriminate himself 
is purely a personal privilege of the witness…The question whether a corporation 
is a “person” within the meaning of this Amendment really does not arise…since 
it can only be heard by oral evidence in the person of some one of its agents or 
employees.96
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Court stated that “we do not see that the right of the parties in regard to the assets of this corporation differ 
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This is closest to the real entity view, since it rejects (like Marshall in Dandridge) the 
aggregate position of looking through a corporation to its shareholders, and takes into 
account the special characteristics of the corporation itself. 
On the other hand, on the Fourth Amendment issue, the Court at first emphasized the 
artificial entity view, using it to justify regulation by the state:
Conceding that the witness was an officer of the corporation under investigation, 
and that he was entitled to assert the rights of the corporation with respect to the 
production of its books and papers, we are of the opinion that there is a clear 
distinction in this particular between an individual and a corporation, and that the 
latter has no right to refuse to submit its books and papers for an examination at 
the suit of the State. The individual may stand upon his constitutional rights as a 
citizen…Upon the other hand, the corporation is a creature of the State. It is 
presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the public. It receives certain 
special privileges and franchises, and holds them subject to the laws of the State 
and the limitations of its charter. Its powers are limited by law. It can make no 
contract not authorized by its charter.  Its rights to act as a corporation are only 
preserved to it so long as it obeys the laws of its creation.  There is a reserved 
right in the legislature to investigate its contracts and find out whether it has 
exceeded its powers.  It would be a strange anomaly to hold that a State, having 
chartered a corporation to make use of certain franchises, could not in the exercise 
of its sovereignty inquire how these franchises had been employed, and whether 
they had been abused, and demand the production of the corporate books and 
papers for that purpose…While an individual may lawfully refuse to answer 
incriminating questions unless protected by an immunity statute, it does not 
follow that a corporation, vested with special privileges and franchises, may 
refuse to show its hand when charged with an abuse of such privileges.97
However, having clearly stated its reasons for limiting the application of the 
constitutional right, the Court suddenly reverts to the aggregate view when facing the 
question whether corporations have any Fourth Amendment rights at all:
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[W]e do not wish to be understood as holding that a corporation is not entitled to 
immunity, under the Fourth Amendment, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures. A corporation is, after all, but an association of individuals under an 
assumed name and with a distinct legal entity.  In organizing itself as a collective 
body it waives no constitutional immunities appropriate to such body.  Its 
property cannot be taken without compensation.  It can only be proceeded against 
by due process of law, and is protected, under the Fourteenth Amendment, against 
unlawful discrimination. Corporations are a necessary feature of modern business 
activity, and their aggregated capital has become the source of nearly all great 
enterprises.98
What can explain this remarkable oscillation between the three views? The key is the last 
sentence quoted. As noted above, the period between 1890 and 1916 marked the height of 
the debate on the rise of the great corporations. The Court is trying to strike a balance 
between the rights of the corporations, which can best be protected under either the 
aggregate or the real entity views, and the regulatory power of the state, which is best 
reflected in the artificial entity view. On the one hand, as the Court states, “[c]orporations 
are a necessary feature of modern business activity” and must be protected. On the other 
hand, the right of the state to regulate must also be preserved, especially since the context 
of Hale v. Henkel was an antitrust investigation into two major corporations, the 
American Tobacco Company and McAndrews & Forbes Inc.
Ultimately, however, the real entity view prevailed.99 This involved first the rejection of 
the aggregate view. For example, in Western Turf Association v. Greenberg, decided just 
one year after Hale v. Henkel, Justice Harlan emphasized that a corporation is a separate 
entity from its shareholders, and therefore is not a “citizen” for purposes of the privileges 
and immunities clause or entitled to the protection of the due process clause: “the liberty 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment against deprivation without due process of law 
is the liberty of natural, not artificial, persons.”100 But by itself this position would have 
led to too much state regulation for the Lochner court. Thus, in Southern Railway Co. v. 
Greene, decided in 1909, the Court came out clearly for the position that the corporation 
as such was entitled to constitutional protection under the equal protection clause, 
without any reference to its shareholders: “the corporation…is within the meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, a person within the jurisdiction of the state of Alabama, and 
entitled to be protected against any statute of the State which deprives it of the equal 
protection of the laws.”101
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Once again, the triumph of the real entity view can be explained by several factors. The 
aggregate view was raised by Field and others to protect the rights of corporations, but it 
was even more incongruous in the context of the mega-corporations of the 1890s, with 
thousands of shareholders, than in the pre-civil days. It also gave the corporation too 
many rights vis-a-vis the state, as seen in Hale v. Henkel and in Greenberg. The artificial 
entity view gave the state too much power to regulate corporations, as the Hale v. Henkel
court came to realize when it laid out its implications. The real entity view was the most 
congruent with business realities as well as the one most suited to some balance between 
corporations and the state. By 1909, it was well established as the dominant view of the 
corporation, as reflected in contemporary debates surrounding the enactment of the 
corporate tax.102
The rise of the real entity view is also reflected in two other contemporary developments: 
the rise of the business judgment rule, and the decline of the ultra vires doctrine.103 The 
business judgment rule rejected the aggregate view in holding that the board of directors 
held powers that were not delegated from the shareholders and that shareholders could 
not normally call into question the exercise of those powers. The ultra vires  doctrine 
represented the ability of the state to require corporations to adhere to their charter, and 
was thus based on the artificial entity view; its decline thus reinforced the rejection of 
that view.
The first full statement of the business judgment rule was made in Leslie v. Lorillard, 
decided by the New York Court of appeals in 1888. The court held that-
In actions by stockholders, which assail the acts of their directors or trustees, 
courts will not interfere unless the powers have been illegally or 
unconscientiously executed…Mere errors of judgment are not sufficient as 
grounds for equity interference; for the powers entrusted with corporate 
management are largely discretionary.104
Union Tel. Co., 216 US 146, 157 (1910); Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 216 US 56, 64 (1910); Western Union 
Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 US 1, 36 (1910), which finally eliminated the restrictions imposed by Bank of 
Augusta v. Earl. See Horwitz, supra.
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A year later the same court expanded this statement, holding that-
All powers directly conferred by statute, or impliedly granted, of necessity, must 
be exercised by the directors who are constituted by the law as the agency for the 
doing of corporate acts. The expression of the corporate will and the performance 
of corporate functions in the management of a corporation, may originate with its 
directors…Within the chartered authority they have the fullest power to regulate 
the concerns of a corporation, according to their best judgment…In the 
management of the affairs of the corporation, they are dependent solely upon their 
own knowledge of its business and their own judgment as to what its interests 
require.105
This rule became well established, so that by 1905 a court could write that “it is [the 
board’s] judgment, and not that of its stockholders outside of the board of directors, that 
is to shape [a corporation’s] policies or decide upon its corporate acts. This principle is 
not disputed, and the citation of authorities in its support is unnecessary.”106 The rule 
reflected the real entity view, which equates the corporation with its management, and 
rejected the aggregate view of the corporation as an aggregate of its shareholders.107
The one potential limitation on the power of the board was the ultra vires doctrine, which 
held that a board could not act contrary to the powers conferred on it by the state. The 
ultra vires doctrine thus represented the artificial entity view.  The doctrine originated in 
the pre- civil war era,108 but became prominent in the arguments on the relationship of the 
state and the corporation in the 1880s and 1890s.109 The artificial entity argument for 
upholding the limitation was stated clearly by the New York Court of Appeals in 1888-
In the granting of charters the legislature is presumed to have had in view the 
public interest; and public policy is (as the interests of stockholders ought to be) 
concerned in the restriction of corporations within chartered limits, and a 
departure therefrom is only deemed excusable when it cannot result in prejudice 
to the public or to the shareholders. As artificial creations, they have no powers or 
faculties, except those with which they were endowed when 
created…Corporations are great engines for the promotion of the public 
convenience, and for the development of public wealth, and, so long as they are 
conducted for the purposes for which organized, they are a public benefit; but if 
allowed to engage, without supervision, in subjects of enterprise foreign to their 
charters, or if permitted unrestrainedly to control and monopolize the avenues to 
105
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that industry in which they are engaged, they become a public menace, against 
which public policy and statutes design protection.110
The doctrine was upheld by the Supreme Court in the following year. Referring to the 
artificial entity doctrine, the Court stated that --
It may be considered as the established doctrine of this court in regard to the 
powers of corporations, that they are such and such only as are conferred upon 
them by the acts of the legislatures of the several States under which they are 
organized.  A corporation in this country, whatever it may have been in England 
at a time when the crown exercised the right of creating such bodies, can only 
have an existence under the express law of the State or sovereignty by which it is 
created.  And these powers, where they do not relate to municipal corporations 
exercising authority conferred solely for the benefit of the public, and in some 
sense parts of the body politic of the State, have in this country until within recent 
years always been conferred by special acts of the legislative body under which 
they claim to exist.  But the rapid growth of corporations, which have come to 
take a part in all or nearly all of the business operations of the country, and 
especially in enterprises requiring large aggregations of capital and individual 
energy, as well as their success in meeting the needs of a vast number of most 
important commercial relations, have demanded the serious attention and 
consideration of law makers.  And while valuable services have been rendered to 
the public by this class of organizations, which have stimulated their formation by 
numerous special acts, it came at last to be perceived that they were attended by 
many evils in their operation as well as much good, and that the hasty manner in 
which they were created by the legislatures, sometimes with exclusive privileges, 
often without due consideration and under the influence of improper motives, 
frequently led to bad results.111
The reference to corporate abuses relates to the rise of trusts, and indeed the ultra vires 
doctrine was used to dissolve sugar and oil trusts under New York and Ohio law.112
However, in 1895 the Supreme Court rejected an antitrust challenge to the sugar trust on 
the grounds that the Sherman Act applied only to corporations engaged directly in 
interstate commerce.113  And in 1896 the Court rejected an ultra vires challenge to the 
ability of the Union Pacific Railway to lease its tracks for 999 years to another railroad, 
when the charter would not permit an outright sale.114 This literal decision significantly 
reduced the power of the ultra vires doctrine.115
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The ultimate demise of the doctrine resulted not from a court decision but from the 
competition among states to attract corporate charters, which was begun by New Jersey 
in 1890 and continued by Delaware in the 1900s.116 This competition meant that New 
Jersey and Delaware had every incentive to relax any limiting elements in their charters 
that restricted the power of corporate management.117 Thus, for example, the long-lasting 
prohibition against corporations owning stock in other corporations, which led to the 
necessity of “trusts”, was eliminated by New Jersey in its 1890 law.118 As a result, 
although the Supreme Court still held in 1899 that such a combination was ultra vires
under New York law, this holding became rather meaningless since most corporations 
were incorporated in New Jersey.119 As the New Jersey statute explains:
It was formerly the rule in this State that acts of a corporation in excess of its 
express powers, or those necessarily implied, were void, and contracts which were 
ultra vires the corporation were incapable of enforcement or ratification…This 
rule no longer obtains.120
The decline of the ultra vires doctrine was sealed by the spread of corporate laws 
permitting incorporation “for any lawful purpose”. With the doctrine gone, the artificial 
entity view of the corporation became less plausible, and the real entity view reigned 
supreme again.121
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4. A Failed Transformation: The Hostile Takeover Crisis.
In 1926 John Dewey published an article in the Yale Law Journal in which he dismissed 
as irrelevant the debate among the aggregate, artificial entity, and real entity views of the 
corporation. These views, he explained, could be deployed to suit any purpose; and he 
used examples relying on the cyclical nature if these theories. His conclusion was that 
theory should be abandoned for an examination of reality.122
Dewey was influential in that the theoretical debate on corporate personality largely 
disappeared until the 1970s. As a practical matter, however, the real entity view 
predominated for large, publicly traded corporations. The board ran the corporation as it 
saw fit, protected from the shareholders by the separation of ownership from 
management noted by Berle & Means in the 1930s, and by the business judgment rule, 
and protected from the state by the relaxation of corporate law limits begun by New 
Jersey and continued by Delaware.
The next significant practical change in this state of affairs only arose in the 1980s. As a 
result of the invention of the junk bond market, it suddenly became possible for hostile 
raiders to threaten takeovers of even the largest corporations. After RJR Nabisco was
taken private for $25 billion in 1988, it was clear that no board was safe. As a result, 
debates on the nature of the corporation and its relationship to the shareholders and the 
state, which began in the academic literature in the 1970s, once again became a matter of 
practical concern. And once again all three theories of the corporation reappeared, as can 
be seen if one examines three seminal cases decided between 1982 and 1989 by the 
Supreme Courts of the United States and of Delaware.  
Edgar v. MITE Corp., decided by the Supreme Court in 1982, involved the 
constitutionality of an anti-takeover act enacted by the state of Illinois.123 Under the 
Illinois Business Take-Over Act, a hostile tender offer for the shares of a company 
covered by the act had to be registered by the Secretary of State and the offeror had to 
give both the target and the state a 20 day notice during which only the target could 
communicate with its shareholders regarding the offer. The act applied both to 
corporations 10% of whose shareholders were resident of Illinois and to corporations that 
were either incorporated in the state or had their principal office in it. The MITE 
corporation made a hostile offer for an Illinois corporation and refused to comply with 
the act, arguing that it violated the commerce clause.
The Supreme Court agreed with MITE. Writing for a 5-4 majority, Justice White held 
that the Illinois act was unconstitutional because it could apply to tender offers that did 
not affect a single Illinois shareholder; “the state has no legitimate interest in protecting 
nonresident shareholders.”124 Moreover, the fact that the target corporation was an 
Illinois corporation was irrelevant since state regulation only applied to the corporation’s 
“internal affairs”: “Tender offers contemplate transfers of stock by stockholders to a third 
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party and do not themselves implicate the internal affairs of the target company.”125
Instead, the focus should be entirely on the impact of blocking the tender offer on the 
company’s shareholders and their relationship with management:
The effects of allowing the Illinois Secretary of State to block a nationwide tender 
offer are substantial.  Shareholders are deprived of the opportunity to sell their 
shares at a premium.  The reallocation of economic resources to their highest 
valued use, a process which can improve efficiency and competition, is hindered.  
The incentive the tender offer mechanism provides incumbent management to 
perform well so that stock prices remain high is reduced.  See Easterbrook & 
Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding  to a Tender 
Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161, 1173-1174 (1981); Fischel, Efficient Capital 
Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash 
Tender Offers, 57 Texas L. Rev. 1, 5, 27-28, 45 (1978); H. R. Rep. No. 94-1373, 
p. 12 (1976).
This part of the opinion clearly reflects the aggregate view: The focus is entirely on the 
impact on the corporation’s shareholders, and the corporation itself (including its 
management) barely exist, as indicated by the statement that a change in corporate 
control has no relevance to the internal affairs of the corporation. The market for 
corporate control is praised because of its ability to overcome the agency cost problem 
and the incentive it provides for management to maximize stock prices. Moreover, White 
quotes the work of Easterbrook and Fischel, who are among the principal proponents of 
the “nexus of contracts” theory of the corporation, according to which the corporation is 
merely a convenient legal term for a series of contracts, the most important of which is 
the contract between shareholders and management.126
This part of the opinion, which rejects both the artificial entity and the real entity 
theories, evoked some misgivings on the part of Justice Powell, even though he joined it 
to provide the crucial fifth vote. Powell noted that in some cases the state may have a 
legitimate interest because the corporation has a real presence that goes beyond a contract 
between management and the shareholders, reflecting both the artificial and real entity 
views:
I join Part V-B because its Commerce Clause reasoning leaves some room for 
state regulation of tender offers.  This period in our history is marked by 
conglomerate corporate formations essentially unrestricted by the antitrust laws.  
Often the offeror possesses resources, in terms of professional personnel 
experienced in takeovers as well as of capital, that vastly exceed those of the 
takeover target. This disparity in resources may seriously disadvantage a 
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relatively small or regional target corporation.  Inevitably there are certain adverse 
consequences in terms of general public interest when corporate headquarters are 
moved away from a city and State.* 
* The corporate headquarters of the great national and multinational corporations 
tend to be located in the large cities of a few States.  When corporate headquarters 
are transferred out of a city and State into one of these metropolitan centers, the 
State and locality from which the transfer is made inevitably suffer significantly.  
Management personnel -- many of whom have provided community leadership --
may move to the new corporate headquarters. Contributions to cultural, 
charitable, and educational life -- both in terms of leadership and financial support 
-- also tend to diminish when there is a move of corporate headquarters.
Five years later Powell had the opportunity to translate these misgivings into an opinion 
for the Court that emphasized instead the artificial entity view of the corporation. CTS 
Corp. v. Dynamics Co. involved a so-called “second generation” anti-takeover statute, 
i.e., one that was drafted to get around the problems with the Illinois statute struck down 
in MITE.127 The Indiana statute applied only to corporations incorporated in Indiana, 
which have specified level of shareholders within the state, and which opt for its 
protection. Under the statute, an acquirer who acquired “control shares” in such an 
Indiana target could vote them only with the approval of a majority of the pre-existing 
disinterested shareholders, to be obtained in a meeting within 50 days after the 
acquisition.
The Court of Appeals followed MITE and declared the statute unconstitutional under the 
commerce clause, because it interfered with the market for corporate control: “Even if a 
corporation’s tangible assets are immovable, the efficiency with which they are employed 
and the proportions in which the earnings they generate are divided between management 
and shareholders depends on the market for corporate control- an interstate, indeed 
international, market that the State of Indiana is not authorized to opt out of.”128
The Supreme Court reversed. Justice Powell, writing for a 5-4 majority, stated that-
No principle of corporation law and practice is more firmly established than a 
State's authority to regulate domestic corporations, including the authority to 
define the voting rights of shareholders…We think the Court of Appeals failed to 
appreciate the significance for Commerce Clause analysis of the fact that state 
regulation of corporate governance is regulation of entities whose very existence 
and attributes are a product of state law. As Chief Justice Marshall explained: “A 
corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in 
contemplation of law.  Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those 
properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as 
incidental to its very existence. These are such as are supposed best calculated to 
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effect the object for which it was created." Trustees of Dartmouth College v. 
Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 636 (1819).129
Powell thus rejected the view that states do not have the right to regulate transactions 
affecting shareholders, including shareholders in other states. He argued that the “free 
market system depends at its core upon the fact that a corporation…is organized under, 
and governed by, the law of a single jurisdiction…A State has an interest in promoting 
stable relationships among parties involved in the corporations it charters.”130 And he 
explicitly rejected the market for corporate control and its underlying aggregate theory: 
“The Constitution does not require the States to subscribe to any particular economic 
theory…there is no reason to assume that the type of conglomerate corporation that may 
result from repetitive takeovers will result in more effective management or otherwise be 
beneficial to shareholders…the very commodity that is traded in the “market for 
corporate control”- the corporation- is one that owes its existence and attributes to state 
law.”131
This entire opinion, with its quotation from Dartmouth College, is clearly based on the 
artificial entity view that the corporation owes its existence to the incorporating state and 
that state may therefore regulate it, including in ways that affect shareholders’ ability to 
sell their shares. Not surprisingly, Justice White dissented, arguing that while the statute 
may help Indiana corporations “particularly in helping those corporations maintain the 
status quo”, it is inimical to the interests of the shareholders and constitutes “economic 
protectionism.”132
After CTS, the battle for corporate control moved to state law, and the most important 
state in this regard was Delaware, in which most major US corporations are incorporated. 
Delaware law was favorable to hostile takeovers until 1989, when the Supreme Court of 
Delaware issued an opinion in Paramount v. Time that in practice ended the hostile 
takeover boom.133 Paramount had made a $175 (later raised to $200) per share offer for 
Time at the time when Time was about to enter into a $70 per share merger with Warner. 
Paramount argued that under the previous decisions of the Delaware Supreme Court in 
Unocal (1985) and Revlon (1986), Time was “up for sale” and therefore the business 
judgment rule was suspended and Time’s board was required to maximize shareholder 
value by accepting the much higher Paramount bid.
The Delaware Supreme Court held in favor of Time. It stated that-
Two key predicates underpin our analysis.  First, Delaware law imposes on a 
board of directors the duty to manage the business and affairs of the corporation. 
This broad mandate includes a conferred authority to set a corporate course of 
action, including time frame, designed to enhance corporate profitability. Thus, 
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the question of "long-term" versus "short-term" values is largely irrelevant 
because directors, generally, are obliged to charter a course for a corporation 
which is in its best interest without regard to a fixed investment horizon. Second, 
absent a limited set of circumstances as defined under Revlon, a board of 
directors, while always required to act in an informed manner, is not under any 
per se duty to maximize shareholder value in the short term, even in the context of 
a takeover.134
The court thus rejected the view that maximizing short-term shareholder value was 
always required; instead, the board was permitted to pursue its view of the best long-term 
corporate strategy:
Delaware law confers the management of the corporate enterprise to the 
stockholders' duly elected board representatives. The fiduciary duty to manage a 
corporate enterprise includes the selection of a time frame for achievement of 
corporate goals. That duty may not be delegated to the stockholders. Directors are 
not obliged to abandon a deliberately conceived corporate plan for a short-term 
shareholder profit unless there is clearly no basis to sustain the corporate strategy.
Thus, the board was permitted to prefer preservation of the “Time culture” (its stated goal 
over maximizing the cash return to shareholders). This effectively killed the takeover 
threat, because any board could find good long-term share value maximization reasons to 
reject a superior cash bid. The Delaware court, in thus enhancing managerial power, in 
effect endorsed the real entity view: A corporation was an entity with its own corporate 
culture, which should not be subordinated to the shareholders or to the state. This view 
was ratified when the ALI corporate governance project adopted a rule that corporate 
boards may take into account the interests of other “stakeholders,” not just the 
shareholders.135
Why did the real entity view prevail? The obvious answer was that corporate 
management determines the state of incorporation, and therefore the Delaware Supreme 
Court felt that it had to side with management once the U.S. Supreme Court had 
approved the anti-takeover laws of other states, lest corporations choose to relocate there. 
However, it seems unlikely that this was the only reason; Delaware is very well 
established as the preferred state of incorporation, and stock values would likely decrease 
if shareholders perceive that management were leaving Delaware just to protect 
themselves. Instead, it seems likely that the Delaware Supreme Court genuinely believed 
that a corporation like Time had a corporate existence and culture with implications for 
other stakeholders, and therefore rejected the aggregate view equating the corporation 
with its shareholders. In that way, its concerns were similar to those raised by Justice 
Powell in his concurrence in MITE: A corporation is more than a “nexus of contracts”, 
and courts and legislatures are allowed to take the interests of other stakeholders into 
account.
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5. Fourth Transformation: From National Corporations to Multinational 
Enterprises.
The last transformation in the nature of the corporation began in the 1950s and is still 
going on, so that its ultimate outcome is hard to judge. This is the transformation from 
corporations based mostly in one country to multinational enterprises based in many 
countries.
Multinationals, in the sense of corporations owning assets overseas, have existed since 
the 17th century. However, as recently as the 1950s, the shareholders and other sources of 
capital, the management, most of the production facilities, and most of the markets of 
even large multinationals tended to be in one country, so that “what was good for G.M. 
was good for America.” By the 1990s, however, this has changed profoundly. As more 
countries opened up to foreign direct investment, communications improved, and many 
products became lighter and easier to ship, more and more corporations became 
“globalized.” In a globalized multinational, the sources of capital are in many countries: 
The shares of large multinationals trade on as many as twenty exchanges, and borrowing 
facilities are similarly diversified. Research and development and production facilities are 
likewise spread throughout the globe, as are markets. The only thing that usually ties a 
modern multinational to its home country is the location of management.
In this context, the debate over the nature of the corporation has re-opened. There is 
abundant academic writing on the relationship between multinationals and the state, and 
most writers from both left and right concede that this relationship has changed 
profoundly so that the home state (the state of incorporation) has become powerless to 
control “its” multinationals; it is hard even to identify to which country multinationals 
“belong”.136 On a practical level this situation has led to attempts by home states to 
control the behavior of multinationals abroad in areas as diverse as trading with the 
enemy, antitrust, corruption and others, with varying success.137 The most recent 
development in this regard has been “inversion” transactions, in which the management 
changes the country of incorporation of a multinational’s parent corporation. These 
transactions are undertaken primarily for tax reasons, but they have corporate governance 
implications as well.138 Specifically, the artificial entity theory becomes hard to maintain 
when management can pick weak countries like Bermuda as the country of incorporation 
for the parent of a multinational.
The relationship with shareholders has also undergone changes as shareholders now tend 
to come from many countries. One implication of this has been that the securities laws of 
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the weakest country tend to dominate because of cross-country price arbitrage.139 Another 
is academic proposals to let management choose the country of securities law as well as 
the country of incorporation.140 On a practical level globalization has led the SEC to relax 
requirements for some foreign issuers.141 This trend has tended to weaken the 
applicability of the aggregate view as well. It is hard to predict where these trends will 
lead, but at the moment they appear once more to favor the real entity view.
To summarize: Throughout all the transformations we have studied, the same pattern 
recurs. As the relationship of the corporation to the state, to society and to its members or 
shareholders changes, all three views of the corporation emerge, submerge and then re-
emerge in a slightly different but fundamentally similar form. In the end, however, the 
real entity view prevails. 
Why does the real entity view prevail? In part, this is no doubt due to the fact that it 
represents the most congenial view to corporate management, because it shields them 
from undue interference from both shareholders and the state. Corporate management 
wields political power and it influences the outcome of the debate; judges again and again 
refer to the importance of corporations, by which they mean corporate management. But 
the very fact that corporate management wields this power shows that there is another 
reason why the real entity view prevails: It fits reality much more than the other two. In 
some periods (e.g., the Roman Empire or 18th century Europe) the power of the state is 
overwhelming and the artificial entity view seems plausible, and in other periods (the 
medieval membership corporation, the 19th century close corporation) the aggregate view 
seems plausible, but in most periods equating the corporation either with the state or with 
shareholders must have seemed to most non-academics highly implausible. The real 
entity view prevailed because it was more real than the others. And this observation 
enables us to move from the historical to the normative part of the discussion and ask 
what implications does the reality of managerial power have for corporate law and 
regulation.
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III. Normative Implications for Corporate Social Responsibility.
What are the implications of these cyclical transformations of corporate theory for the 
problem of CSR? Can we draw any conclusions on the legitimacy of CSR from the 
history described above? I would argue that the answer is yes, and that the dominance of 
real entity theory for most of corporate history has far reaching implications for the 
legitimacy of CSR activities, for the reasons explained below.
a. The Three Theories and CSR. 
Each of the three theories of the corporation permits a different level of CSR, as indicated 
in the following table:
Table 1: Theories of the Corporation and CSR
Theory Aggregate Artificial Real
Type of CSR
For long-run benefit Yes Yes Yes
    of shareholders
Not for shareholders,
Corporation responsible     No Yes Yes
Not for shareholders,
Corporation not responsible No No Yes
The first type of CSR involves activities that can clearly and demonstrably benefit 
shareholders in the long run. For example, actions that prevent environmental disasters or 
comply with legal and ethical rules can have a significant positive effect in preventing 
disastrous corporate calamities, even if they cost money in the short run. Thus, even 
proponents of the aggregate theory, the currently dominant theory of the corporation in 
academic circles, would support this type of CSR.
The second type of CSR involves activities that are designed to mitigate social harms the 
corporation was responsible for, even when there is no direct legal responsibility, and 
when no benefit to the shareholders can be shown. Under the aggregate theory, such 
activities should not be permitted because they do not benefit shareholders. But under the 
artificial entity theory, since it emphasizes the benefits of corporate existence derived 
from the state, an implicit contract can be inferred that the corporation will help the state 
in mitigating harms that it causes even in the absence of legal responsibility. Otherwise, 
the state will have to bear this burden imposed by the corporation it created.
Finally, the third type of CSR involves activities like AIDS prevention, for which the 
corporation is not responsible and which in most cases do not benefit its shareholders, 
even in the long run. This type of CSR would not be required or even permitted under the 
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aggregate or artificial entity theories. But under the real entity theory, since the 
corporation is regarded as a person just like individuals, it is permitted to act 
philanthropically just like individuals are, and should in fact be praised to the extent it 
does so.142
Thus, under the real theory, even CSR activities that have nothing to do with benefiting 
shareholders or with direct corporate responsibility are permitted. This still requires an 
answer to the two arguments advanced by Levitt, Friedman, Jensen and their 
colleagues.143
First, the argument that the money being spent on CSR belongs to the shareholders and 
therefore management have no right to spend it according to their preferences in ways 
that are not related to maximizing shareholder value. However, as long as the 
corporation’s CSR activities are adequately disclosed to the shareholders (and the 
securities laws are designed to assure such disclosure is made), it is not clear that they 
have a right to complain. If the shareholders do not like the firm engaging in CSR 
activities, they can sell the shares and invest solely in firms that do not engage in such 
activities. Even in today’s world, it is unlikely that shareholders will find it difficult to 
eschew firms that engage in CSR, although most large publicly traded firms do so.
Moreover, it can be argued that the majority of current shareholders, namely those who 
invest through mutual funds and pension funds, invest primarily to obtain a secure return 
and not for maximum but risky gains. In this sense, most shareholders today are more 
like bondholders or preferred shareholders, who care more about a stable return than 
about value maximization. For those shareholders, firms that promise a secure, 
reasonably high return are a good investment, even if they reduce the chances of 
obtaining returns over that limit by engaging in CSR. Those shareholders who seek to 
maximize returns are then free to invest in firms that do not engage in CSR. 
Second, the argument that if firms are free to engage in CSR, it will be more difficult to 
evaluate management performance since there will be no single benchmark like earnings 
per share. This may be true, but in a complex world, we are used to evaluating leaders on 
more than one benchmark. We would not seriously argue that political leaders, for 
example, must be evaluated only on their economic performance and on no other 
measure. If we can use complex measures to evaluate politicians, we can do the same for 
CEO’s.
Finally, as Chen and Hanson point out, there is an internal inconsistency in Milton 
Friedman’s argument, because if markets are efficient they should prevent managers from 
engaging in actions that are not in the best interest of shareholders.144  Friedman may in 
fact have believed that to be the case, but the dominance of the real entity view of the 
corporation through 2,000 years of corporate history suggests that management usually 
find a way to do as they wish, including engaging in CSR when it may not be in the long-
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term interest of shareholders. Since the courts are unable to effectively police such 
behavior and markets are an inefficient constraint, it is unclear what in practice is gained 
by arguing in favor of shareholder primacy and against CSR.
Thus, if the historical argument advanced above is correct, and real entity theory is in fact 
the dominant theory of the corporation for most of its history, this can justify CSR to a 
much greater extent than is commonly accepted by most corporate law academics. Why, 
then, has the aggregate theory achieved such success in US academic circles? The answer 
requires a comparative perspective.
b. The Three Theories and Varieties of Capitalism: A Comparative Perspective.
Political economists distinguish among three types of advanced capitalist societies. Under 
the “varieties of capitalism” framework, economies can be differentiated by their 
comparative institutional advantages. In general, economies can be characterized as either 
liberal (market economies, such as the UK), corporatist (organized market economies that 
rely on tightly integrated private and networked associations to resolve significant 
dilemmas of economic integration, such as Germany), or statist (depending on 
hierarchical solutions in resolving coordination problems, such as France).145
The varieties of capitalism framework suggest that firms in each of the three models of 
economic governance will distinguish themselves in different fields. In liberal market 
economies, the advantages of a flexible regulatory structure benefits industries targeting 
low costs and those operating in sectors characterized by radical innovation (e.g., 
software, bio technology). In corporatist economies, high levels of business coordination 
benefit sectors that rely on long-term contracts, and firms specialize in high quality, scale 
intensive and specialized supplier industries (autos, machine tools, chemicals). Statist 
economies favor large scale-intensive industries that have long time horizons or require 
major capital investment (autos, transport).146
There is an obvious correlation between the three varieties of capitalism described by 
political economists and the three historical theories of the firm outlined above. The 
liberal model of the UK and the US, with its emphasis on arm’s length relationships and 
public trading, best first the aggregate theory of the firm. The statist, hierarchical model 
of France, with its emphasis on the relationship between the firm and the state, best fits
the artificial entity model. And the German and Japanese style corporatist model best fits 
the real entity theory.
This relationship can also explain why in Europe CSR is much less controversial than in 
the US. Practically every EU government (including even the UK) has programs 
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designed to foster CSR.147 These kind of programs are hard to imagine in the US context 
given the widespread hostility to CSR.
Fundamentally, therefore, the debate around CSR is linked to another wide-spread debate 
in corporate law: Whether corporate law is destined to “converge” on the US model of 
publicly traded corporations with dispersed share ownership, or whether other models 
(such as the German and Japanese models) are viable. The aggregate, nexus of contracts 
theory is closely linked to the US corporate governance model, while other models are 
much more open to CSR. Recent literature has given rise to doubts about the convergence 
hypothesis, but this debate will no doubt continue.148
The purpose of this article has been to show, however, that even in the US context the 
aggregate theory has not always been dominant. In fact, throughout most of the history 
described above, the real theory was the dominant one, and it can be argued that in 
practice most corporations are still operating on the basis of the real theory, not the 
aggregate one. Thus, CSR, which as we have seen is most easy to justify in all its forms 
on the basis of the real theory of the corporation, is likely to remain practiced for the 
future. The debate on CSR should therefore shift from whether CSR is acceptable to how 
to make it more accountable and effective in obtaining socials goals- but that is an issue 
for another day.149
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